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Abstract
We investigate the hypothesis that conditioning transfers to poor
families on school attendance leads to a reallocation of household re-
sources enhancing the human capital of the next generation, via the
eﬀect of the conditionality on the shadow price of human capital. We
estimate the price eﬀect of conditional transfers to mothers on intra-
household allocations using data from a social program in Mexico, and
show that price eﬀects are large and statistically signiﬁcant. The esti-
mates suggest that household resources beyond those directly subject
to conditionality have been reallocated favorably to children’s human
capital.
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The design of social policies which encourage human capital accumulation
among the poor, thus breaking the transmission of poverty from one gener-
ation to the next, is a basic concern for development economists. Roughly
speaking, these policies can be classiﬁed as either “supply-side” interven-
tions, attempting to improve the infrastructure or quality of education, or
“demand-side” interventions, attempting to provide incentives for poor par-
ents to keep their children longer in school and engage in other activities
bolstering human capital accumulation. A number of recent demand-side
interventions, in countries like Mexico, Brazil, Colombia and Honduras, in-
volve cash and in-kind transfers to parents that are conditional on the school
attendance of their children. In this paper, we provide a model to study the
eﬀects of conditional transfers on intra-household allocations, and conduct an
empirical analysis of the impact of a conditional transfer program in Mexico.
The model we propose combines elements of the household production
approach pioneered by Becker [4, 21] and the collective household approach
developed by Chiappori and his co-authors [11, 12, 13]. We treat schooling
as one input in the production of children’s human capital. Other important
inputs are the time devoted by family members to children’s human capi-
tal and the consumption of children. By subsidizing schooling, conditional
transfers reduce the shadow price of human capital acquisition. The price or
conditionality eﬀect of transfers, then, involves not only an increase in school-
ing but also in the time devoted to school homework and in the consumption
of children. The impact on these other inputs may very well precede the
impact on schooling. Suppose, for instance, that conditional transfers induce
families which already send their children to primary school to anticipate
they will send their children also to secondary school. Then, independently
of income eﬀects, parents will devote more resources to children now if these
resources are perceived to be complementary with more years of schooling in
the production of human capital.
Income and price eﬀects do not exhaust all implications of conditional
transfers for intra-household allocation. Conditional transfers are typically
paid to the mother of the family. A wide empirical literature (including the
work of Thomas [31], Schultz [28], Lundberg, Pollak and Wales [19], Duﬂo [16]
1and others) has shown that changes in the household income distribution, and
in particular beneﬁts oriented to the mother, may shift household expenditure
patterns in directions favorable to children. Thus, we treat the household as
a collective entity, and allow schooling subsidies to vary the weight of the
mother’s preferences in the household utility function. In the description of
the model, we provide conditions under which a higher weight of the mother’s
preferences translates into a shift favorable to children.1 If parents have CES
preferences and the initial bargaining power of the mother is small, these
conditions entail that the elasticity of substitution between own consumption
and the consumption and human capital of the children cannot be much
smaller than one. This, in turn, implies that price eﬀects cannot be small.
Note that the price eﬀect of conditional transfers on resources allocated to
children is due to the impact of an expected or current increase in schooling
on human capital acquisition. Price eﬀects capture the mobilization of family
resources toward human capital accumulation in response to a lower price for
one input, schooling. On the other hand, income and bargaining eﬀects may
lead to a reallocation favorable to children even if conditional transfers have
little eﬀect on schooling or if schooling is not perceived by families to have
a signiﬁcant impact on human capital acquisition due to, say, low quality
of schools available to the poor. Isolating the eﬀects of conditionality on
intra-household allocation from income and bargaining eﬀects gives a good
indication about the perception by beneﬁciaries of the impact of increased
schooling on human capital acquisition and hence of the impact of a condi-
tional transfer program on breaking the intertemporal poverty linkage. An
evaluation relying on the impact of the program on schooling would need
to be based on some assumption about similar returns to education across
individuals.2
We use data from the evaluation of a recent conditional transfer program
in Mexico, Progresa, to estimate the conditionality eﬀect of the program on
1As opposed to what seems to be a common implicit assumption in the empirical
literature, the assumption that the marginal utility of child goods is larger for the mother
than for the father is not suﬃcient for this result. (See also Bergstrom [10].)
2Such an evaluation of conditional transfers in Mexico has been carried out by Schultz
[29] and by Behrman et al. [8]. Ultimately, an evaluation of the eﬀects of demand-side
intervention will need to rely on the ex post impact on earnings of the cohort that beneﬁted
from the program, as in Duﬂo’s [17] evaluation of a supply-side intervention in Indonesia.
2intra-household allocation. Progresa provides monetary and in-kind transfers
to mothers in very poor families in exchange for regular attendance of their
children to school and periodic medical check-ups of children and adults.
The objective of the empirical analysis is to distinguish the price or condi-
tionality eﬀect from the income and bargaining eﬀects of the program on
time devoted to children and household expenditure on child goods, which
are in the model complementary with human capital accumulation, and on
household expenditure on adult goods, which are substitutes.
Our empirical analysis aims at a sample of households for which the in-
come and bargaining eﬀects of the program are similar but which face diﬀer-
ent schooling subsidies at the margin. We take advantage of previous studies
(Schultz [29], Sadoulet and de Janvry [27]), which have shown little impact
of Progresa grants on enrollment at the primary level (due to the very high
enrollment rates of children in primary school prior to the implementation
of the program) but strong impacts at the secondary level. We thus clasify
education grants for children in primary school as unconditional income, and
education grants for children in secondary school as conditional income. We
also take advantage of a design feature of Progresa, which limits total ben-
eﬁt amounts per family to a maximum level. We assume that the income
and bargaining eﬀects of the program are similar across families that could
potentially receive the maximum level of beneﬁts. Restricting attention to
these families, we estimate how investment in inputs to child human capi-
tal vary with the proportion of Progresa beneﬁts which are conditional to
schooling. We make use of the experimental design of Progresa to diﬀerence
out unobservable aspects of the family correlated with conditional income.
Our results are supportive of the hypothesis that larger schooling subsi-
dies at the margin lead families to spend a larger share of resources on their
children, beyond what is directly required to satisfy conditionality. In par-
ticular, price eﬀects seem to account for a large fraction of the total impact
of the program on the increase in the expenditure share of girls’ clothing and
on the decrease in boys’ labor force participation. Moreover, while the total
eﬀect of the program is negative on time spent doing (school) homework,
the price eﬀect is either positive or close to zero, suggesting that it is strong
enough to counter for a change in the composition of the sample of school
children, toward children with a larger opportunity cost of time.
3A number of empirical papers have been motivated recently by Progresa.
Attanasio and Lechene [3] and Rubalcava, Teruel and Thomas [25] use the
program database to provide further evidence of the existence of bargaining
eﬀects of transfers directed to the mothers. We diﬀer from them by trying to
ascertain the importance of the conditionality eﬀects of the program. Davis
et al. [15, 26] focus on the distinction between the eﬀects of Progresa ver-
sus Procampo, an agricultural subsidy program in which the beneﬁciary is
very rarely the mother. Attanasio, Meguir and Santiago [2] and Todd and
Wolpin [33] have done structural estimations of the impact of Progresa on
schooling in dynamic models in which the family acts as a single agent. Al-
location of family resources to market goods is not a concern in either work.
Todd and Wolpin [33], however, perform a counterfactual exercise compar-
ing conditional and unconditional transfers which concludes that the eﬀect
of conditionality on schooling is very strong.
In previous work [20], we analyzed the welfare eﬀects for household mem-
bers of school subsidies under the assumption of Nash bargaining. Our cur-
rent framework is not restricted to Nash bargaining, allows for changes in
the bargaining power of adults as a result of subsidies, and incorporates the
household production of human capital. Apps and Rees [1] and Chiappori [14]
have combined before the domestic production and the collective household
approaches, but they do not deal with household “public goods” such as chil-
dren’s consumption and human capital. Finally, Behrman et al. [6] develop a
model where the human capital for the child is produced domestically using
maternal time, child time and school goods under some simplifying assump-
tions, such as loglinear utilities and perfect complementarity in production.
The focus there is on the possibility of maternal schooling augmenting the
eﬀect of maternal time on the production of human capital.
2 The Model
2.1 Household Production and Bargaining
Consider a household consisting of a mother, a father and a child, respectively
A, B, and C. The adults’ utility functions are separable in four basic com-
modities, A’s consumption (ZA), B’s consumption (ZB), the child’s current
4consumption (ZC), and the child’s human capital (H). The adults’ utility
functions are given by
UA = UA(ZA,ZC,H) and UB = UB(ZB,ZC,H).
Note that child’s consumption and human capital are “public goods” from
the point of view of the adults.
There are m market goods. Each household member’s consumption is
produced domestically using a vector of market goods and a fraction of his
or her time:
ZA = ZA(xA,tA), ZB = ZB(xB,tB), ZCZC(xC,tC),
where xA ∈ <m
+ is the vector of market goods used in the production of ZA
and tA is the time devoted by A to the production of ZA, and similarly for
the other terms.
The child’s human capital, in turn, is produced domestically using market
goods and the time of each household member:
H = H(xH,hA,hB,hC,e),
where xH is the vector of market goods used in the production of H, hM is
the time devoted by M = A,B,C to the production of human capital, and
e is the time spent by the child in formal education.
The endowment of each household member is T units of time, that can
be devoted to the activities mentioned before or to earn a wage in the labor
market. (Note that this recognizes the existence of child labor.) We nor-
malize to one the prices of market goods and the wages that the members
of the household can earn in the labor market. The household receives an
unconditional transfer s0 and a subsidy rate 0 ≤ s < 1 to formal education.
Thus, the household budget constraint is given by
1 · (xA + xB + xC + xH) ≤
(T − tA − hA) + (T − tB − hB) + (T − tC − hC − e) + s0 + se.
As in the collective household approach, we assume that the household
decision is the result of maximizing
µ(s0,s)UA + (1 − µ(s0,s))UB
5subject to the household budget constraint. The term µ is the “bargain-
ing power” of A, which is a function of s0 and s. In principle, it depends
not only on transfers and subsidies but also on other prices and wages, but
we keep these constant throughout. More generally, if we introduce in the
model unearned income, we can allow bargaining power to be sensitive to
the unearned income of A and B. The function µ is nondecreasing in both
arguments; the idea is that transfers and subsidies are paid to the mother so
they cannot possibly reduce and may actually increase her bargaining power.
Under the assumption that the production of the basic commodities ex-
hibits constant returns to scale, we can deﬁne “commodity prices” πA, πB,
πC, and πH(s) to be equal to the unitary cost of production of ZA, ZB, ZC
and H, respectively. We write πH as a function of s because the unitary cost
of production of human capital depends on the school subsidy:
πH(s) = min
xH,hA,hB,hc,e
xH + hA + hB + hc + (1 − s)e
s.t. H(xH,hA,hB,hc,e) = 1.
Note that the commodity prices depend on the household production func-
tions, and thus they are potentially diﬀerent across families. Provided that
in every solution of the household decision problem each member devotes
some time to the labor market, we can reduce the household problem to
max
ZA,ZB,ZC,H
µ(s0,s)UA(ZA,ZC,H) + (1 − µ(s0,s))UB(ZB,ZC,H)
s.t. πAZA + πBZB + πCZC + πH(s)H ≤ 3T + s0.
Assuming that the utility functions of the parents are continuous, qua-
siconcave, and strictly increasing in own consumption and (jointly) in the
consumption and human capital of the child, and that the marginal utility of
each argument grows unboundedly as the value of the argument goes to zero,
the program has an interior solution. We assume further that the solution is
unique, that is, that family demand functions exist for any (strictly positive)
commodity price vector.
2.2 Price, Income, and Bargaining Eﬀects
In the framework described above, consider two households that are iden-
tical in every respect, except that one faces the social policy s0
0,s0 and the
6other faces the policy s00
0,s00. The diﬀerence between the allocations chosen
by the ﬁrst and the second households can be split into three components,
corresponding to a “bargaining eﬀect,” an “income eﬀect” and a “price ef-
fect.” The bargaining eﬀect corresponds to a movement along the budget
hyperplane of the ﬁrst family as a result of substituting the “new” household
preferences, given by µ(s00
0,s00) for the “old” household preferences, given by
µ(s0
0,s0). The magnitude of the bargaining eﬀect is directly related to the
impact of change in social policy on the bargaining power of the mother.
The empirical work of Schultz [28], Thomas [31], and others suggests that
an increase in the power of the mother within the household has a positive
impact on spending on women’s and children’s consumption. As noted by
Bergstrom [10], to obtain a positive bargaining eﬀect on the family public
goods (ZC and H) requires more than the marginal utility of the public goods
being higher for A than for B. The examples in subsection 2.2 illustrates a
set of circumstances under which the bargaining eﬀects are as conjectured.
The price eﬀect is a movement along an indiﬀerence curve given by the
“new” household preferences. Since the subsidy reduces the price of human
capital, an increase in the subsidy rate will have a positive price eﬀect on H.
It seems likely that the price eﬀect will be positive on the consumption of
the child and negative on the consumption of the adults. The reason for this
conjecture is that child consumption and human capital may very well be
complementary from the viewpoint of the preferences of both adults in the
household. Mulligan [22] argues that parents who devote more resources to
children at present become more altruistic toward them and more willing to
make further sacriﬁces toward their future welfare. Turning this argument
around, if parents expect children to be better oﬀ in the future, they will
have added incentives to become altruistic. Or, after Becker [5], parents who
expect children to have more human capital and hence a larger income in
the future will devote more resources to them at present to foster altruism
toward parents in them.
The income eﬀect is a movement along the income expansion path associ-
ated to the new household preferences and the new commodity prices, given
by π(s00). The income eﬀect is likely to be positive on all basic commodities,
as it seems natural to expect own consumption, consumption of the child
and human capital to be normal goods for both adults.
7The objective of the empirical analysis in the next section is to estimate
the price eﬀect as a function of the the subsidy rate. This is done by con-
sidering a sample of households which face diﬀerent subsidy rates, but for
which the maximum possible beneﬁt is constant. In terms of our model,
beneﬁts oﬀered to these households satisfy the constraint that s0 + sT 0 is
constant, where T 0 < T is the maximum time that the child can dedicate
to formal schooling. This is only an approximation to the extent that the
maximum refers to monthly payments while the model deals with lifetime
beneﬁts, which may diﬀer for households with children of diﬀerent age. Also,
we ignore possible issues arising from the fact that the households in the
sample have several children, as we cannot distinguish empirically between
resources allocated to diﬀerent children, save for the child’s time use.
The idea of the empirical analysis is the following. Consider a household
for which the subsidy rate is large enough for it to dedicate T 0 units of time
to formal schooling. As s is reduced and s0 increased to keep s0 + sT 0 con-
stant, it is reasonable to expect the bargaining power of the mother to either
remain approximately constant or to increase, since unconditional income is
substituted for conditional (potential) income. Moreover, a reduction in s
compensated by an increase in s0 that keeps the older allocation (in terms of
market commodities and time use) in the budget constraint is equivalent to
estimating the (Slutsky) compensated price eﬀect for reductions in the sub-
sidy rate. This is a good local approximation, though it underestimates the
“true” (Hicks) price eﬀects for normal goods. Thus, our empirical exercise
can be considered a conservative estimation of the price eﬀect for resources
allocated to children and for resources allocated to the father of the family,
to the extent that in both cases the price and the bargaining eﬀect operate
in the same direction. For large variations of the subsidy rate, our exercise
most likely underestimates price eﬀects for every household commodity due
to the imperfect account of the income eﬀect.
2.3 Examples
A Cobb-Douglas Family. Let the preferences of the parents be given by
UA(ZA,ZC,H) = (1 − δA)logZA + δA logmin{ZC,H},
UB(ZB,ZC,H) = (1 − δB)logZB + δB logmin{ZC,H},
8with 0 < δB < δA < 1, and let T = 1/3. Suppose the social policy changes
from s0
0,s0 to s00
0,s00. Price and income eﬀects are easily calculated and have
the appropriate signs. In particular, the price eﬀect on the consumption of














where δ(s0,s) = µ(s0,s)δA+(1−µ(s0,s))δB. The above expression is positive
if and only if s00 > s0.
Bargaining eﬀects also have the appropriate signs; in particular, the bar-













this expression is positive if and only if µ(s00
0,s00) > µ(s0
0,s0).
A CES Family. More generally, let the preferences of the parents be given
by








for 0 < q < 1 and








for q < 0, with the case q = 0 given by the Cobb-Douglas example above,
with 0 < δB < δA < 1 and T = 1/3. The signs of price and income eﬀects
correspond to those conjectured in the description of the model. Interest-
ingly, however, increasing the bargaining power of the mother may reduce the
consumption and human capital of the child. Note that the objective func-
tion of the family is also CES. Using the well-known CES demand function,
we can obtain the consumption of the child and human capital as a function
of the bargaining power of the mother for a given commodity price vector:













+(µδA + (1 − µ)δB)
1/(1−q)(πC + πH)
q/(q−1).
The relationship between child consumption (and human capital) and the
bargaining power of the mother is inverted-U shaped if q > 0 and U-shaped
if q < 0. To see this, diﬀerentiating with respect to µ, we obtain that the













When q > 0, an increase in the bargaining power of the mother has a positive
eﬀect if the bargaining power of the mother in the initial situation is small
enough. But when q < 0, the inequality is reversed, i.e. the bargaining eﬀect
is positive only if the initial bargaining power of the mother is large enough.
If q is close to zero then the bargaining eﬀect is positive for all µ except
very close to 1 (if q > 0) or very close to 0 (if q < 0). But if q is negative
and far from zero the inequality becomes more stringent. This means that an
elasticity of substitution much smaller than one (implying small price eﬀects)
cannot be reconciled with the assumptions that the family chooses a Pareto
allocation, that the initial bargaining power of the mother is small and that
bargaining eﬀects are positive on child consumption and human capital.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data
The data we use comes from the evaluation eﬀort of Progresa, the main
anti-poverty program of the Mexican Government. This program provides
cash grants to poor families in exchange for these families sending children
to school regularly and fulﬁlling a schedule of family health clinic visits. The
cash grants are given directly to the mother of the family. Grant amounts
for the ﬁrst semester of 1999 are detailed in Table 1. On average, Progresa
10beneﬁts represent about 20% of the value of family consumption prior to the
program (Skouﬁas [30]). In the original program design, Progresa provides
grants linked to children in third through ninth grade. Since 2001, after
the data we use was collected, Progresa (re-christened as Oportunidades)
extended educational grants to the high school level. Maximum total monthly
transfers per family were restricted in the ﬁrst semester of 1999 to 695 pesos;
this feature of the program design is crucial for our estimation procedure.
Table 1. Transfers from Progresaa











Nutrition grants (monthly transfers per family)b
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a At ﬁrst semester 1999. All amounts in Mexican pesos (10 pesos ≈ US$ 1). Maximum
monthly transfer per household: 695. Actual mean monthly payment for families eligible
for maximum transfer: 448.
b ‘Nutrition grants’ are conditional on family health clinic visits and there is no explicit
or implicit monitoring of spending on food.
In 1997, at the start of the program, Progresa carried out a social ex-
periment in which a random sample of 506 rural eligible communities were
selected in the seven Mexican states where the program was ﬁrst imple-
mented. 320 communities were assigned to receive beneﬁts (the treatment
group) and the remaining 186 were assigned to a control group that would
receive beneﬁts about two years later, at the beginning of the year 2000. All
households in the treatment and control communities (a total of 24,077) were
interviewed prior to implementation of the program. The baseline household
census (ENCASEH97) was collected in November 1997. Behrman and Todd
[9] analyze the distribution of household characteristics between the control
11and the treatment group, and conclude that there are some very small though
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences. Table 2 uses information from the base-
line census to show that, prior to implementation, households potentially
eligible for maximum monthly beneﬁts in the control and treatment group
were fairly similar. Note that all but two of the t-tests for diﬀerences between
households in the two groups are insigniﬁcant at the 10% level.
Table 2. Household characteristics
Households eligible for maximum beneﬁts in control and treatment group (1997)
Control Treatment t-Test
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Pr(equality)
Total income 1454 1397 1484 1643 0.694
School attendance:
children aged 8 to 11 0.989 0.102 0.983 0.129 0.195
children aged 12 to 16 0.644 0.479 0.671 0.470 0.085
Land owned 2.12 3.00 2.25 5.06 0.566
Water 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.634
Electricity 0.72 0.45 0.70 0.46 0.275
Dirt ﬂoor 0.68 0.47 0.67 0.47 0.641
Head’s age 45.37 9.70 44.96 9.68 0.401
Spouse’s age 36.79 13.69 36.96 13.69 0.814
Head’s years of schooling 2.24 2.09 2.37 2.13 0.235
Spouse’s years of schooling 1.88 2.11 1.99 2.22 0.336
Household size 8.52 2.02 8.63 2.11 0.299
Indigenous head 0.35 0.48 0.33 0.47 0.300
Indigenous spouse 0.31 0.47 0.30 0.47 0.691
Boys aged 0-2 0.22 0.45 0.25 0.50 0.108
Boys aged 3-5 0.36 0.55 0.35 0.54 0.587
Boys aged 6-8 0.47 0.61 0.50 0.62 0.328
Boys aged 9-11 0.58 0.64 0.58 0.65 0.973
Boys aged 12-14 0.68 0.67 0.69 0.70 0.741
Boys aged 15-18 0.64 0.67 0.69 0.71 0.150
Boys aged 0-18 2.95 1.46 3.07 1.52 0.126
Girls aged 0-2 0.21 0.45 0.25 0.51 0.095
Girls aged 3-5 0.30 0.52 0.29 0.50 0.864
Girls aged 6-8 0.47 0.62 0.46 0.59 0.889
Girls aged 9-11 0.64 0.68 0.61 0.67 0.369
Girls aged 12-14 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.870
Girls aged 15-18 0.63 0.71 0.68 0.72 0.162
Girls aged 0-18 2.93 1.50 2.97 1.55 0.541
12Households in the treatment group began to receive beneﬁts in March
1998. Follow-up interviews (ENCEL) have been carried out every semester;
the October 1998, May 1999, and October 1999 rounds are available at
present. We use the May 1999 round because, unlike the other two, it has in-
formation on time use and does not coincide with the beginning of the school
year. Patterns of spending at the beginning of the school year are likely
to be distorted because spending on child clothing includes school uniforms,
which may be mandatory in some schools. Moreover, at the beginning of the
school year children in primary receive in-kind supplies, whereas secondary
school children are given a ﬁxed cash amount to be used to buy school sup-
plies. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of the variables of interest for the
control group in 1999, which we assume in the analysis below can represent
pre-program levels for the treatment group.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics




Boys’ clothing 2.46 3.41
Girls’ clothing 2.27 3.30
Men’s clothing 1.61 2.64
Women’s clothing 1.29 1.99
Transport 3.73 8.44
Time devoted to homework (daily minutes)
Children aged 8 to 11 58.80 36.12
Children aged 12 to 16 64.48 43.25
School attendance (percent)
Children aged 8 to 11 0.92 0.27
Children aged 12 to 16 0.70 0.46
Labor force participation (percent)
Boys aged 8 to 11 0.03 0.18
Boys aged 12 to 16 0.27 0.44
Girls aged 8 to 11 0.02 0.12
Girls aged 12 to 16 0.08 0.28
133.2 Empirical Speciﬁcation
The objective of the empirical tests is to estimate the impact of school sub-
sidies on resources allocated to diﬀerent family members for households that
are potentially eligible for maximum monthly beneﬁts. As argued in the
previous section, both income and bargaining eﬀects should be roughly sim-
ilar for households in the treatment group in this sample, so the estimation
should capture the price eﬀect of subsidies.
To compute a proxy for the school subsidy at the margin of decision of
the family, we take the nutrition grants and the grants for children at the
primary level to be “unconditional income,” and then deﬁne the diﬀerence
between unconditional income and the total maximum beneﬁt, which is due
to secondary school grants, as “conditional income.” We use conditional
income as a proxy for school subsidies. Dealing with primary grants as un-
conditional income is consistent with previous studies of the program impact,
which have shown little or no eﬀect of Progresa on enrollment at the primary
level (where enrollment is very high anyway), and large eﬀects on enrollment
at the secondary level. Note that both conditional and unconditional income
refer to potential beneﬁts and not to actually collected beneﬁts. We calculate
conditional income using the ages and schooling levels of children in 1997,
just prior to program implementation. For instance, children who would be
eligible for a secondary school grant in our year of analysis are deﬁned as
those children who had between ﬁve and seven years of completed school-
ing in the fall of 1997, and thus could potentially be enrolled in secondary
school (7th through 9th grade) in May 1999. In this way, our deﬁnition of
conditional income is exogenous to the program.
As proxies for household resources allocated to the diﬀerent family mem-
bers, we use spending on boys’ and girls’ clothing and on adult clothing, time
devoted by children to school related homework, and child labor. Clothing
is an example of a market good whose allocation inside the household is
easily discernible, so that variations in spending on child clothing, in adult
female clothing, and in adult male clothing can serve as proxies for varia-
tions in the vector of market goods used in the production of ZC, ZA, and
ZB, respectively. Given the assumed complementarity between ZC and H,
we expect the price eﬀect of school subsidies to be positive on spending in
child clothing and negative on spending in adult clothing. Using data on
14expenditure shares, rather than spending, has the advantage of reducing the
importance of income eﬀects. With homothetic preferences (as in the exam-
ples above), and due also to the assumption of constant returns to scale in
home production, income eﬀects on expenditure shares are actually zero. In
terms of time use, if there is not much substitution between the inputs in
the production of human capital, we expect time devoted to the children’s
human capital to move jointly with H. Thus, the prediction is that the price
eﬀect is positive on schooling and time devoted to school related homework,
and in consequence negative on child labor.
We estimate the following regression at the household level:
Shk = α0k + α1kPh + α2kDh + α3kPhDh +
P
j βjkXhj + hk,
where Shk refers to indicator k (spending shares of adult male clothing, adult
female clothing, boys’ clothing and girls’ clothing) for family h, Ph represents
the proportion of conditional income for household h, Dh is an indicator of
whether the household is in the treatment group, Xhj represents the control
variable j for household h (household demographics and household expen-
diture), and hk is an error component reﬂecting unobserved characteristics.
We estimate a similar regression at the children level, substituting i for h. In
this case, Sik refers to indicator k (time devoted to school homework, school
attendance, child labor) for individual i, Pi represents the proportion of con-
ditional income for i’s household, Di is an indicator of whether i’s household
is in the treatment group, and Xij represents the control variable j for i’s
household. The treatment group dummy intends to capture program eﬀects
that have not been explicitly modelled; for instance, women are required
to attend monthly health lectures, which seem to have had an impact on
expenditure in food.
Note that α3k, the coeﬃcient of interest, is a double diﬀerence estima-
tor. It allows us to test whether the eﬀect of potential conditional income is
diﬀerent for households in the treatment group than for those in the control
group. If our sample included only households in the treatment group, the
coeﬃcient on conditional income might be capturing unobservable variables
also correlated with our indicators of interest. For instance, households with
a larger proportion of conditional income may have children of diﬀerent abil-
ities as evidenced by their previous overall achievement (and thus years of
15completed schooling) in school. We carried out similar regressions restricting
our attention to the treatment group. The estimated eﬀects are similar to
(and often larger than) those reported in the text.
3.3 Results
We begin by demonstrating that, in fact, the eﬀects of Progresa on enroll-
ment at the primary school level are much smaller than those at the sec-
ondary level. Table 4 replicates the double diﬀerence estimators carried out
by Schultz [29] for two groups, children aged 8 to 11 and children aged 12 to
16, corresponding approximately to primary school (3rd through 6th grade,
which is when grants can be received in primary) and secondary school (7th
through 9th grade).
Table 4. Program impact on enrollment
Pre-program level Impact (percent)
Nov. 1997 Nov. 1998 Nov. 1999
All households
Children aged 8 to 11 0.972 0.013 0.01
[9788] (0.004)*** (0.004)***
Children aged 12 to 16 0.597 0.073 0.08
[9698] (0.014)*** (0.017)***
Households eligible for maximum beneﬁts
Children aged 8 to 11 0.975 0.011 0.004
[2757] (0.006)* (0.007)
Children aged 12 to 16 0.537 0.063 0.054
[3819] (0.021)*** (0.028)**
Observations in brackets
Standard errors in parenthesis
*Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%
Table 4 conﬁrms higher impacts on secondary school enrollment for both
the entire sample and the sample of households eligible for the maximum
16beneﬁt. Note that, at the secondary level, impacts are somewhat lower for
households eligible for the maximum beneﬁt, which is consistent with the
idea that families react to the reduced marginal incentive to send additional
children to school.
We turn now to our empirical tests. Table 5 presents the eﬀect of the
proportion of conditional income on various categories of expenditures shares
for families with children aged 8 to 17. If our hypotheses are correct, condi-
tional income should show diﬀering eﬀects on spending on goods which are
plausibly substitutes and complements with investment in children’s human
capital.
Table 5. Impact of conditional income on expenditure shares
Households eligible for maximum beneﬁts with children aged 8 to 17
Food Boys’ clothing Girls’ clothing
conditional income -0.06421 0.01624 0.02018
× treatment group (0.04842) (0.01078) (0.01045)*
conditional income 0.0052 -0.00271 -0.00904
(0.04213) (0.00938) (0.00909)
R2 0.08 0.06 0.11
Women’s clothing Men’s clothing Transport
conditional income 0.00712 0.00182 0.00372
× treatment group (0.00655) (0.00817) (0.02183)
conditional income -0.00864 -0.002 0.01017
(0.00570) (0.00711) (0.01900)
R2 0.04 0.04 0.05
Observations: 1596
Standard errors in parenthesis
*Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%
Regressions include a dummy for treatment group and controls for age, sex, and education
of household head and spouse, a dummy indicating whether they speak an indigenous
language, number of boys and girls by age groups (0-2, 3-5, 6-8, 9-11, 12-14, 15-18),
dummies for water and electricity access and for dirt ﬂoor, land (has.), and total household
expenditures and its square.
17The results are somewhat supportive of strong price eﬀects. The esti-
mated coeﬃcient of conditional income on the proportion of resources dedi-
cated to spending on both boys’ and girls’ clothing is positive and signiﬁcant
for girls. An increase in the share of conditional income of about 10% (corre-
sponding to an increase of about 35 pesos or $ 3.5US to conditional income
and a corresponding decrease in unconditional income) would increase the
share of spending on girls’ clothing by 0.2, or an increase of 9% from pre-
program levels. The results on adult male and female clothing are positive
but insigniﬁcant.
Turning to child level variables, we consider ﬁrst the eﬀect of conditional
income on time spent by children doing school homework. We distinguish
here between children of primary and secondary school age. The eﬀects may
be diﬀerent for these two groups, since Progresa may change the composi-
tion of children attending school, given the large impact on enrollment in
secondary school. If those children who return to or continue their school-
ing with Progresa, but who otherwise would have dropped out, are “worse”
students who spend less time studying, then one might observe that Pro-
gresa reduces the average time spent doing homework.3 Table 6 presents
both OLS and tobit estimations, although more than 90% of school children
report doing homework. For primary school children, the results show a pos-
itive and signiﬁcant eﬀect. According to the estimations, an increase of 10%
in the proportion of conditional income would correspond to an approximate
increase of 2 minutes per day doing homework. In terms of pre-program
levels, this would be an increase of about 3.4%. The results for secondary
school children are negative though insigniﬁcant, quite possibly reﬂecting the
composition change in this group described above.
Finally, we consider child labor. We restrict our attention to boys aged
12 to 16, since labor force participation for boys aged 8 to 11 and for girls in
general is quite low, as illustrated by Table 3. The probit results in Table 7
show that conditional income has a negative and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect
on the probability that boys in secondary school age participate in the labor
market. An increase in 10% in the proportion of conditional income would
reduce the labor force participation of this group by about 2.2 percentage
points, implying a decrease of about 8.7% from pre-program levels.
3A similar observation is made by Behrman et al. [7].
18Table 6. Impact of conditional income on time devoted to
school homework
Children aged 8 to 11 in households eligible for maximum beneﬁts (I)
OLS Tobit
z }| {
Latent Uncond. Cond. on Prob.
variable exp. value censored uncensored
conditional income 0.19728 0.19288 0.1828 0.1551 0.0006
× treatment group (0.09785)** (0.10338)*
conditional income 0.03671 0.05318 0.0504 0.0428 0.0002
(0.08297) (0.08756)
R2 0.03
Children aged 12 to 16 in households eligible for maximum beneﬁts (II)
OLS Tobit
z }| {
Latent Uncond. Cond. on Prob.
variable exp. value censored uncensored
conditional income -0.02603 -0.02594 -0.0246 -0.0210 -0.0001
× treatment group (0.11098) (0.11790)





Observations: 1524 (I) and 1395 (II)
Standard errors in parenthesis
*Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%
Regressions include same controls as Table 5 (treatment group dummy, household charac-
teristics, household expenditure) and age of the child.
19Table 7. Impact of conditional income on labor force
participation
Boys aged 12 to 16 in households eligible for maximum beneﬁts
conditional income -0.00221




Standard error in parenthesis
*Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%
Regression includes same controls as Table 6.
3.4 Price Eﬀects versus Total Eﬀects
How large is the conditionality eﬀect relative to the total program eﬀect?
To answer this question, we estimate the total program eﬀect on household
expenditure and children’s time use using the sample of households eligible
for the maximum amount of beneﬁts. The results are reported in Tables
8, 9 and 10, which are comparable with Tables 5, 6 and 7, respectively.
Looking ﬁrst at Table 8, the total eﬀect of the program on the household
expenditure share of boys’ and girls’ clothing is about 0.9. Recall that our
estimates suggested that an increase of 10 percentage points in the proportion
of conditional income would increase spending on girls’ clothing by about
0.2. Conditionality then would seem responsible for a large percentage of the
impact.
20Table 8. Program impact on expenditure shares
Households eligible for maximum beneﬁts with children aged 8 to 17
Food Boys’ clothing Girls’ clothing
treatment group 1.01661 0.79126 0.88445
(0.89209) (0.19659)*** (0.19087)***
R2 0.06 0.06 0.11
Women’s clothing Men’s clothing Transport
treatment group 0.32166 0.19167 -0.38230
(0.11973)*** (0.14938) (0.40413)
R2 0.03 0.03 0.02
Observations: 1596
Standard errors in parenthesis
*Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%
Regressions include same controls as in Table 5, except for household expenditure and its
square.
With respect to time spent on school related homework, Table 9 shows
that the total eﬀect of the program is insigniﬁcant for children aged 8 to 11
and negative and signiﬁcant for children aged 12 to 16. This is consistent with
the composition change described in the the previous subsection. Children
who would not have enrolled without Progresa are likely to have a larger
opportunity cost of time, in relation to the expected returns of education,
and hence spend less time studying. Thus, the impact estimate of Progresa
includes both the direct eﬀect of the program and a (negative) composition
eﬀect. It is remarkable that, in spite of the compositional bias downward
revealed in Table 9, the conditionality eﬀect was positive.
Finally, Table 10 reports that the labor force participation of boys aged
12 to 16 was reduced by 6 percentage points as a result of the program,
according to a probit regression. Again, the conditionality eﬀect seem to
explain a large proportion of this eﬀect. Recall that our estimates suggested
that an increase in 10 percent in the proportion of conditional income would
reduce the labor force participation of boys by about 2 percentage points.
21Table 9. Program impact on time devoted to school homework
Children aged 8 to 11 in households eligible for maximum beneﬁts (I)
OLS Tobit
z }| {
Latent Uncond. Cond. on Prob.
variable exp. value censored uncensored
treatment group -0.74701 -1.49986 -1.4211 -1.2054 -0.0046
(1.78013) (1.88338)
R2 0.02
Children aged 12 to 16 in households eligible for maximum beneﬁts (II)
OLS Tobit
z }| {
Latent Uncond. Cond. on Prob.
variable exp. value censored uncensored





Observations: 1524 (I) and 1395 (II)
Standard errors in parenthesis
*Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%
Regressions include same controls as in Table 6, except for household expenditure and its
square.
Table 10. Program impact on labor force participation




Standard error in parenthesis
*Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%
Regression includes same controls as previous table 6, except for household expenditure
and its square.
22It is noteworthy that our estimates of the total eﬀect of the program are
generally in agreement with those of previous studies, though previous studies
have dealt with all households rather than with the sample of households
eligible for the maximum beneﬁt. For instance, with respect to children’s
clothing, Hoddinot et al. [18] report an overall increase in expenditures on
children’s clothing of about 49% in 1999. This corresponds to an increase
of 1.1 in the expenditure share of children’s clothing. With respect to labor
force participation, Parker and Skouﬁas [23] report that the program reduces
labor force participation for boys aged 8 to 17 in 1999 by about 2.5 percentage
points, with the largest eﬀects on boys aged 14 to 15 at 6 percentage points.
3.5 Robustness
Since the proportion of conditional income is correlated with the proportion
of children in secondary school, it is conceivable that we overestimate price
eﬀects if, somehow, income and bargaining eﬀects of the program are larger
for secondary school than for primary school children. In fact, the correlation
between our indicator of conditional income and the proportion of secondary
school aged children is high (0.88), but not perfect, because grants vary ac-
cording to school grade and sex, and because of the cap to maximum beneﬁts.
As a robustness test, we re-run the regressions reported in Tables 5 through 7,
including additional variables measuring the proportion of secondary school
aged children and its interaction with the treatment group dummy. In spite
of the high co-linearity, we continue to estimate signiﬁcant eﬀects of condi-
tional income for both spending on child clothing (positive) as well as child
labor (negative). The relevant coeﬃcient estimates in Tables 11 and 13 are
slightly larger than those reported in Tables 5 and 7. Note that we obtain
negative (though insigniﬁcant) impacts of conditional income on the share
of spending on adult clothing. In the case of time use, reported in Table 12,
we are unable to identify separately the eﬀect of conditional income from the
proportion of children eligible for secondary. Overall, these additional results
suggest that, if at all diﬀerent, bargaining and income eﬀects are stronger for
families with a larger proportion of children in primary so that our previous
results may underestimate conditionality eﬀects.
23Table 11. Impact of conditional income vs children in
secondary school age on expenditure shares (clothing)
Households eligible for maximum beneﬁts with children aged 8 to 17
Boys Girls Women Men
conditional income 0.04898 0.03129 -0.01001 -0.01264
× treatment group (0.02383)** (0.02314) (0.01449) (0.01806)
children in secondary -0.03319 -0.01125 0.01725 0.01480
× treatment group (0.02139) (0.02077) (0.01300) (0.01621)
R2 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.04
Observations: 1596
Standard errors in parenthesis
*Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%
Regressions include conditional income, proportion of children in secondary school age, a
dummy for treatment, and same controls as in Table 5.
Table 12. Impact of conditional income vs children in
secondary school age on school homework
Children in households eligible
for maximum beneﬁts:
Age 8 to 11 Age 12 to 16
conditional income 0.07406 0.07989
× treatment group (0.20111) (0.24479)
children in secondary 0.14365 -0.11197
× treatment group (0.20527) (0.23137)
R2 0.03 0.05
Observations: 1524 children aged 8 to 11 and 1395 children aged 12 to 16
Standard errors in parenthesis
*Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%
Regressions include conditional income, proportion of children in secondary school age, a
dummy for treatment, and same controls as in Table 6.
24Table 13. Impact of conditional income vs children in
secondary school age on labor force participation
Boys aged 12 to 16 in households eligible for maximum beneﬁts
conditional income -0.00542
× treatment group (0.00311)*
children in secondary 0.00328
× treatment group (0.00279)
Observations: 1601
Standard error in parenthesis
*Signiﬁcant at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%
Regression includes same controls as Table 6.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a model to analyze the impact of school subsidies
for the poor on intrahousehold allocations. If schooling is an input in the
production of human capital, then school subsidies will reduce the shadow
price of human capital accumulation and henceforth lead to a reallocation of
household resources toward this activity. Thus, the model suggests that in
order to assess the impact of school subsidies on human capital accumulation
it may be useful to consider not only the direct impact on schooling but also
the impact on household expenditure patterns and on the time use of family
members. However, since programs of school subsidies for the poor typically
involve monetary transfers to the mother of the family, the impact of the
subsidies on household expenditures and time use patterns may be due to
the increased bargaining power of the mother rather than to the impact of
the school subsidies on the shadow price of human capital. This means that
it is important to isolate bargaining from price eﬀects of school subsidies.
A simple CES example shows that, surprisingly enough, positive bargaining
eﬀects coupled with the assumption of eﬃcient bargaining in the family imply
strong price eﬀects.
25We use data from the evaluation of Progresa, a program of school subsi-
dies for the poor in Mexico, and estimate the price eﬀects of the program.
Ideally, distinguishing between price and bargaining eﬀects could be done by
comparing the impact of the program on two groups of similar households,
one receiving conditional transfers and one receiving unconditional transfers.
Since that was not the social experiment conducted, we have tried to ap-
proximate it by exploiting the fact that the program establishes a cap to
total monthly beneﬁts per household that is binding for a sample of about
1600 families. We also exploit the fact that pre-program enrollment in pri-
mary school was already very high, so the relevant margin of decision for
beneﬁciary families is whether to send (more of) their children to secondary
school. Thus, we treat primary school grants as unconditional income, and
we deﬁne conditional income as the remainder of the maximum beneﬁt. Our
estimates suggest a strong eﬀect of the proportion of unconditional income
to the maximum possible beneﬁts over household expenditure patterns and
time allocation of children. We interpret this as evidence that the school sub-
sidies have had an impact on the shadow price of human capital, and that
household resources beyond those directly subject to conditionality have been
reallocated favorably to children’s human capital.
Some of the important eﬀects of school subsidies may have to do with
intertemporal incentives for household allocation. For instance, it is hard to
explain otherwise the positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of conditional income on
time spent by primary school children doing homework. A proper considera-
tion of intertemporal incentives requires a dynamic framework beyond what
we have attempted in this paper, and it seems an exciting avenue of research
both theoretically and empirically.
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